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Does Microcredit Reduce Poverty? An Empirical
Exploration in India
Introduction
In recent years increasing research has argued that microcredit has not
delivered on its promise of reducing poverty. Much of this research has
focused on high-level outcomes, such as income and the living standard
of the poor. There has been little research, however, on why exactly
microcredit does not work. In particular, there has been little research
focused on the microenterprises directly. In this exploratory study based
on in-depth interviews with 205 clients of for-profit microcredit in India, we
investigate why the microenterprises have not made good use of microcredit. We find the basic problem is that the lending policies of the
microcredit organizations are designed to lower the costs and risks, and
hence increase the profits of the organization, and are not responsive to
the needs of the clients and their microenterprises.
In this article, we review the background of microcredit, especially
in South Asia; and then present the results of our exploratory study in
India. A short conclusion section is offered at the end.

The Rise of Microcredit
The Nobel Peace Price for 2006 was awarded to the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh and its founder Professor Muhammad Yunus, Ph.D., a
pioneer of the microcredit movement. Dr. Yunus started experimenting
with forms of microfinance in the late 1970s and then founded the iconic
Grameen bank in 1983*. In thirty years, microcredit had gone from an
experiment to the newest silver bullet for reducing poverty. The Nobel
Committee affirmed that microcredit must play a major part in eliminating
poverty. The central objective of the Grameen Bank has been to “reverse
the age-old vicious circle of ‘low income, low saving & low investment’,
into virtuous circle of ‘low income, injection of credit, investment, more
income, more savings, more investment, more income’”. The United
Nations, having designated 2005 as the international year of Microcredit,
declared on its website, “currently microentrepreneurs use loans as small
as $100 to grow thriving business and, in turn, provide their families,
*

In principle microfinance includes various financial products such as credit, savings, and
insurance. In practice, credit accounts form, by far, the bulk of activities of most microfinance
organizations. In this paper, we use the terms microcredit and microfinance interchangeably.
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leading to strong and flourishing local economies.” Many institutional
donors such as United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the World Bank supported microfinance. Wealthy
philanthropists such as financier George Soros and e-Bay co-founder
Pierre Omidyar pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to the microcredit
movement.
As microcredit programs became increasingly focused on growing
the size of their loan portfolios, they outgrew their charitable roots and
looked for new sources of capital to expand their reach.
With encouragement from philanthropists, many turned to commercial
equity investors. This was congruent also with the growing view that the
private sector could profitably play a larger role in poverty reduction -the
so-called 'bottom of the pyramid' proposition. CK Prahalad in his popular
book The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid argued that we should
recognize the poor as “resilient and creative entrepreneurs,” and
commended commercial banks, such as ICICI in India, which were
expanding into microcredit (Prahalad 2004). Global commercial banks,
such as Deutsche Bank AG and Citigroup Inc., established microcredit
funds. Elisabeth Rhyne, who ran the Center for Financial Inclusion, said in
her Congressional testimony in 2010 that banks and finance firms served
60 percent of all clients. In India, 95% of total microcredit borrowers are
covered by for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs) (M-CRIL 2012).
Since private equity capital is incompatible with the nonprofit
approach, sometime around 2005 many nonprofit microcredit
organizations changed their status to for-profit enterprises. One of the
most prominent examples of this trend was Banco Compartamos in
Mexico, which in 2007 launched an initial public stock offering that brought
in $458 million for 30 percent of the company; private investors, including
the bank's top executives, pocketed $150 million from the sale (Malkin
2008). The high valuation was not surprising since the bank was earning a
return on equity of more than 40 percent. Another prominent example was
SKS Microfinance in India, whose initial public offering in 2010 raised
$350 million; its founder Vikram Akula sold all his shares for $13 million in
a private sale (Bajaj 2011).

The Decline of Microcredit
All this euphoria surrounding microcredit has died down significantly in the
initial years of the 21st century. One of the authors of this paper was an
early critic of microcredit, and argued in 2007 on conceptual grounds that
Microfinance Misses its Mark (Karnani 2007; please also see Karnani
2017 and Karnani and McKague 2019 in MGDR). Other critics have gone
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further and argued that microfinance undermines sustainable development
(Bateman 2011). Much recent academic research based on empirical
evidence, especially randomized control trial methodology, concludes that
microcredit has no significant impact on poverty reduction (Banerjeee,
Karlan, and Zinman 2015). It might have some modest impact on
consumption smoothing, risk management, and female empowerment;
however, the primary objective and promise of microcredit is that it
reduces poverty. Given the amount of financial and human resources that
have been devoted to microcredit in the four decades since the Nobel
award for Yunus, lack of significant impact on reducing poverty is a strong
criticism of microcredit. These resources could have been deployed more
usefully in other poverty reducing interventions.
Why has microcredit not been effective at reducing poverty? A
microcredit client is an entrepreneur in the literal sense: She raises the
capital, manages the business, and takes home the earnings. In the
contemporary sense, however, true 'entrepreneurs' are visionaries who
convert new ideas into successful business models. Most people do not
have the skills, vision, creativity, and persistence to be true entrepreneurs
(Karnani 2007). Clients of microcredit are entrepreneurs by necessity, not
out of choice. Thus, it might not be surprising that microcredit is not that
effective. It would be useful, nonetheless, to empirically research the
causes of why microcredit is not effective. Much of the recent empirical
research has been designed to measure the impact of microcredit, but has
not focused on the causes of this impact, or lack thereof. In an attempt to
address this gap, we conducted an on-the-ground exploratory research
study. The logic underlying the microcredit proposition is that poor people
will borrow small sums of money, invest in microenterprises, and the
increase in profits will lift the borrower out of poverty. Accordingly, we
chose to focus on the microenterprises, and investigated how microcredit
leads to (or does not lead to) increasing the profits generated by these
enterprises.
From the start of the 21st century, there has been growing evidence
that microcredit does not have a significant impact on reducing poverty. In
spite of that, the global microfinance sector grew by 16 percent annually
during the five years 2011-2015, and was expected to grow by 10-15
percent in 2016 (ResponsAbility Investments AG 2015). In India, the
microcredit sector has grown much faster, at the compounded annual
growth rate of 44 percent during the years 2011-2015, and an impressive
64 percent growth in the fiscal year 2014-15 (Micro Finance Institutions
Network 2016).
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What explains this incongruity between the rapid growth of the
microcredit sector, especially in India, and the lack of its effectiveness in
reducing poverty? It is likely that the growth is being driven by high profits
of the sector, rather than achievement of some larger societal objective. In
India, for-profit microfinance organizations account for 95 percent of the
microcredit sector (M-CRIL 2012). The microcredit industry earned an
average return on equity of 10.5 percent in the year 2014-15; more than
one-third of microcredit organizations earned a return on equity of above
15 percent. This is a very profitable industry indeed. We hypothesize that
microcredit has not had a significant impact on reducing poverty because
the policies of the microcredit organizations have been driven much more
by the profit motive than the societal objective of reducing poverty.

Research Design
This study is based on research conducted by one of the authors as part
of the thesis required by the Fellow Programme in Management at the
Management Development Institute, Gurgaon, India. This was an
exploratory study for identifying the determinants of growth of
microfinance borrowers. This paper focuses on one critical determinant:
the credit policy of for-profit microfinance providers. We conducted indepth qualitative interviews with 205 clients of three for-profit microcredit
organizations in India. To preserve their anonymity, we name these as
MFI1, MFI2 and MFI3. The organization MFI1 had a client base of 570
thousand people and credit portfolio of over Rs. 2,000 million; it is one of
the pioneers of microfinance in India.† MFI2 had a client base of 192
thousand people and a loan portfolio of Rs. 1,817 million. MFI3 had a
client base of 32 thousand people and loan portfolio of Rs. 270 million.
Our study covered two states in India: Uttar Pradesh and
Rajasthan. Both states have a per capita income below the Indian
average, and are less industrialized than India as a whole. Both states are
famous for handicraft, especially embroidery -this enhances the scope for
self-employment and microcredit.
The interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire, and
focused on the microenterprise and the determinants of its growth. Field
and branch officers of the three microcredit organizations were also
interviewed. We observed the interaction between the MFI officers and
their clients. We also studied the marketing brochures, loan application
forms, loan appraisal forms, and the annual reports of the three MFIs.
†

USD 1 was worth about INR 67 in 2016.
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Microenterprises do not maintain accounting records; hence, it is
difficult to measure the success of the enterprise by growth in revenues or
profits. Following previous literature, we measured enterprise success by
growth in employment generated (Asian Development Bank 1997; Kuzilwa
2005; Nichter and Goldmark 2009). Interview subjects could easily recall
the number of employees in the enterprise. In this study, employment was
defined to include full time wage employment, full time employment for
family members of working age, and part-time wage employment. To
better assess the impact of microcredit on enterprise success, all the
interview subjects had been microcredit clients for a minimum of 2 years.
The analysis was a Directed Content Analysis (Hsieh and Shannon,
2005). The study started with a few given determinants discussed in
existing literature. In the first step, the data was coded and placed in these
broad primary determinants. As the study progressed, we
modified/discarded a few existing determinants and some new
determinants were added. For example, we started with the assumption
that Joint Liability Groups would have some impact on enterprise
performance, but there were no responses confirming that, so we dropped
this variable. Inadequacy of the loan amount emerged as a strong
determinant so we added that as a new variable. In the second and the
third steps, these primary determinants were clubbed together to construct
more theoretically grounded determinants. Questions were also added or
deleted during the early phase of the interviews. For example, questions
around use of communication technology were added when it was
observed that rural women were taking orders from urban customers over
phone.

Research Results
The results of the larger study identified six determinants – these included
credit policy of the MFI, location of the market accessible to the micro
entrepreneur, accessibility to a value chain, presence of a functional
cluster, gender of the entrepreneur and the initial investment in the
enterprise. The latter 5 determinants were either external factors beyond
the control of the entrepreneur, or factors related to the micro
entrepreneur like gender and initial investment. Credit policy of the MFI
highlighted how the different aspects of policy impact the growth prospects
of a micro entrepreneur. Important components of the policy that had a
significant impact on the end result that microcredit does not reduce
poverty were:
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•
•
•
•

Borrower selection criteria of the MFI
Uniform product for all types of micro enterprises
Inadequacy of the loan amount
Fungibility of loan amount

There were two striking results from our interviews. Microcredit did
not lead to enterprise growth and employment generation in even a single
instance out of the 205 cases. Granted our metric for enterprise success –
growth in employment – is a stringent measure. Still, it is interesting that
microcredit did not lead to enterprise growth in even one out of 205 cases.
The enterprises that were growing were either hereditary (located in
clusters and carrying out hereditary work) or the shop was established by
using family resources, and had been there for more than 5-6 years while
the MFIs had started the operation for not more than 3 years. Also, these
enterprises were generating employment even before they received
microcredit. So clearly, the growth cannot be attributed to the credit. This
result, of course, is entirely congruent with recent empirical research that
shows that microcredit does not have a significant impact on poverty
reduction.
Second, all the three MFIs had identical lending policies; the client
eligibility criteria for the three MFIs included:
1. The microenterprise should have existed for at least one
year
2. The household must have a 'pakka' (brick and cement)
house
3. The client must be a permanent resident of the area
The loan amount was fixed at Rs. 15,000 for MFI1 and MFI2, and
at Rs. 12,000 for MFI3.
These eligibility criteria may be prudent lending norms, and lead to
low default rates and high profitability, but are incongruent with the
societal objective of reducing poverty. Microcredit can have a
transformative impact only if it leads to creation of microenterprises that
are the source of livelihood for the poor. Confining loans to
microenterprises that are already more than one year old implies that the
capital for creating the enterprise came from some other source, such as
own savings, loans from friends and family, and local moneylenders.
Microenterprises operate in very competitive environments with low entry
barriers and have very little competitive advantage; they are vulnerable
enterprises with very low margins; and many fail. The microenterprises
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that have survived for more than a year have already crossed the most
vulnerable period when they needed the capital support the most. A
microentrepreneur whose business has already survived for more than
one year has probably already climbed out of poverty. This eligibility
criterion implies that microcredit could have only an incremental impact on
poverty at best.
The second condition of the client household owning a 'pakka'
(brick and cement) house virtually excludes all truly poor people. The
poverty line in India is set by the government at Rs. 32 per person per day
in rural areas, and at Rs. 47 in urban areas. This is similar to the World
Bank poverty line of $1.90 per day per person at purchasing power parity
rates, which is equivalent to about Rs. 38. Poor people living below any
such poverty line usually live in a shack or a mud house and are very
unlikely to own a 'pakka' house. This eligibility criterion virtually
guarantees that microcredit is targeted at people who are already not that
poor. Thus, microcredit cannot reduce poverty. Very few, if any, truly poor
people can satisfy the first two eligibility criteria and are thus outside the
scope of the for-profit microcredit sector.
These eligibility criteria severely limit the pool of qualified
borrowers. As a result, all the MFIs end up targeting the same set of
potential borrowers. This makes the eligible client vulnerable to borrowing
too much and becoming too indebted. This is the reason why the Reserve
Bank of India – India’s Central Bank, equivalent to the Federal Reserve in
the United States – has limited the number of loan accounts of borrowers
to two.
The loan appraisal system of the MFIs does not even attempt to
assess the business model of the enterprise nor its financing needs. The
appraisal forms did not have space for assessing the expected cash flow
of the business, its gestation period, capital needed, or even the scope of
the business activity. Instead, the forms had space for evaluating the
repayment capacity of the clients, such as present household income,
number of earning members, and ownership of vehicles. The present
repayment capacity, rather than future cash flow from the business, is the
sole basis for approving the loan. As an example, one loan officer
approved a loan because the client could afford to send children to an
English medium school (which are more expensive than local language
schools) and the household owned a motorcycle. This appraisal system
certainly simplifies the process and lowers the administrative cost, and it
also probably improves the repayment rate. The very idea of lending to
enterprises that have existed for at least a year is contrary to the
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underlying concept of microcredit being used to create new productive
assets that provide the household with a sustainable source of income.
The three MFIs provided only one standard loan product to their
clients. The brochures did list multiple products, but in practice, the MFI
offered only one product in any geographic area. There was no flexibility,
and the product offered the same loan amount, repayable over the same
time period, the same interest rate, and the same installment payment to
all the clients. The heterogeneity of the business enterprises was totally
ignored, which is consistent with the loan appraisal system described
above. For example, the respondents interviewed had very different
occupations including photocopier service, tailor, beauty parlor, and
welding. These occupations entail very different capital needs; a
photocopying machine costs more than Rs. 100,000 while a sewing
machine costs under Rs. 10,000, but all the clients were given a loan of
Rs. 15,000 for MFI1 and MFI2, and Rs. 12,000 for MFI3. The repayment
schedule made no allowance for differing gestation periods of the
business and offered no grace period before the repayments start. For
example, a retail kiosk might have a shorter gestation period than a
manufacturing enterprise. Growth potential of the enterprise also was not
considered. For example, a retail kiosk in a village might have limited
growth potential compared to an embroidery 'factory' catering to a larger
geographic region. The focus of the MFIs is on simple, standardized
processes and lower administrative costs which does not cater to the
heterogeneous needs of the microenterprises and thus has minimal
potential for transformative change.
Not only is the loan amount fixed, it is also too small. From the
perspective of the MFIs, this is a financially prudent policy for reducing
risk. But, all the microentrepreneurs interviewed in this study found the
loan amount to be inadequate to the capital needs of the business
enterprise. For example, a buffalo costs more than Rs. 40,000, but the
loan amount was fixed at Rs. 15,000 (or Rs.12,000 for MFI3). A few
respondents claimed that since they did not have the additional capital,
they purchased a calf instead of a buffalo. Since the calf would not
generate income for a while, they had to make the loan repayments from
other income. The MFI field staff admitted that the loan amount was not
enough to start a new profit generating business. A woman in the furniture
business, when asked why she did not expand, replied "If you want to
know what is stopping us then it is the capital -- if we have money we can
grow." She claimed she was ready to borrow 5 to 6 times the loan amount
and would be able to repay it in the same time period; the larger loan
would enable her to deal with the seasonality of the business. Capital
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crunch was mentioned by several respondents as the single most
important reason for low growth rate.
Because of the small size of the loan amount and the eligibility
criterion that the enterprise be older than one year, the most common use
of the microcredit was to fund working capital. We should not discount the
value of a loan for working capital. Although even on this dimension, a
bangle-maker client who used the loan for working capital claimed it was
too little: "Loan amount is like salt in curry"
One way to deal with the inadequate loan amount was to borrow
from several MFIs simultaneously. Many respondents mentioned this
tactic, even though the government rule limited them to only two loan
accounts. Several clients also mentioned borrowing from other, more
expensive, private sources.
All interview respondents viewed money as fungible. The loan
amount became part of the household corpus of funds and was used
depending on the current priorities of the family. This was truer for the
more affluent households who had multiple sources of income, and often
used the microcredit loan for activities such as purchasing a motorcycle or
to pay for a marriage. The MFI field staff knew about such practices but
did not object since the repayment capacity was not affected. The less
affluent microentrepreneurs that had no other source of capital were more
likely to use the microcredit in the business enterprise.
MFI1 and MFI2 offered additional services, such as agribusiness
advice, for helping the microenterprises to grow. Yet, the MFI staff
admitted that very few microcredit clients used these services. These
services were not complimentary and the clients had to pay for them
separately. One MFI branch manager said that at a meeting to tell clients
about these services, the only question that most clients asked was "when
will we get the money?" Many of our interview subjects did not even know
that the MFIs offered any such services; most of the subjects who did
know about the services were not interested. The MFIs do not
aggressively promote these services. One reason could be that these
services are not nearly as profitable as the microcredit operations.

Conclusion
Much recent research has demonstrated that microcredit does not have a
significant impact on reducing poverty. Our exploratory study focused on
the microenterprises funded by for-profit microcredit to better understand
the causes of this lack of impact through in-depth qualitative interviews
with 205 microcredit clients in India. We find the basic problem is that the
lending policies of the microcredit organizations are designed to lower the
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costs and risks, and hence increase the profits of the organization, and
are not responsive to the needs of the clients and their microenterprises. It
is thus not surprising that these microcredit organizations have so little
impact on reducing poverty. This casts doubt on the popular libertarian (or
'bottom-of-the-pyramid') proposition that there are many opportunities for
businesses to earn significant profits and simultaneously alleviate poverty.
The goal of maximizing private profits is not always compatible with the
broader societal objective of reducing poverty.
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